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International Aid to German Refugees

BY DAVID H. POPPER

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with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

ANNEXATION of Austria and Sudetenland by Germany has focused the world's attention on the plight of the unfortunates who have fled or must flee from the Greater Reich. The problem presented by these political refugees is not new. It is as old as history; and since the World War Russians, Armenians, Greeks, Turks, Assyrians, Italians, Spaniards and others, in numbers totaling several millions, have been forced to seek refuge in exile.¹ Such conditions seem inevitable under dictatorial régimes, where intolerance is an essential component of social organization. When the victims are few in number, they are absorbed in other lands without great difficulty. When the number is large, dislocations arise in the countries of origin and refuge which belie the assertion that mass persecution is purely an internal problem. At that stage, only a concerted international effort can adequately cope with the situation.

A WORLD OF BARRIERS

Before the war, the problem for political refugees was comparatively simple. They passed without undue friction into the great stream of world migration, which brought an average of one million immigrants each year to the shores of the United States, and large numbers to other relatively undeveloped areas.² Travel, the transfer of funds, and settlement within a rapidly growing economic community were virtually unrestricted. Even for those refugees created as a direct result of war and revolution after 1914 the difficulties did not seem unsurmountable. With international assistance they somehow found havens where they could exist. To be sure, the depression revealed that those whose

assimilation had been hindered by hope of eventual return to their native land had only an insecure foothold in the economic life of their countries of residence.³ Yet their plight is surpassed by that of those who today must either emigrate involuntarily or live under intolerable conditions.

Since 1929 the prevalence of world-wide crisis conditions has resulted in an almost unbroken march toward economic nationalism and national self-sufficiency. To insulate themselves against economic pressures from outside, states have raised tariffs and other trade barriers to new high levels. They have placed the transfer of currency and foreign exchange under more or less stringent official control. They have brought to an end the era of relatively free migration which characterized pre-war Europe. By drastic legal and administrative restrictions on immigration, they have sought to preserve all employment opportunities for the temporarily overabundant domestic labor supply. The result has been a noticeable evolution toward a world of closed national entities. The currents of European migration, which benefited new countries by providing labor for the exploitation of natural resources and old countries by relieving the pressure of surplus population, have virtually ceased. The greater stability of the old European national economies has even produced a return flow of emigrants to their native lands.⁴

During the last three years, when some measure of economic stabilization was achieved, the situation has shown a slight tendency to improve. The economic significance of migration has again been understood, and some steps have been taken in countries of settlement to encourage its resump-

1. For a summary description of earlier refugee movements, cf. "The Movement of Political Refugees," *The Round Table* (London), September 1938, pp. 678-91.

2. In the 10-year period July 1, 1905-June 30, 1914, a total of 10,121,940 immigrants entered the United States. *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1936* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1936), p. 95.

3. In some countries, 50 per cent of the refugee population was unemployed in 1937. Cf. Countess Waldeck, "The Great New Migration," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), April 1937, p. 541.

4. For statistical data, cf. International Labour Office, *Year Book of Labour Statistics, 1937* (Geneva, 1937), pp. 201-08, 209.

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tion. In the main, however, conditions cannot be said to have undergone a basic change, particularly as far as political refugees are concerned.⁵ Involuntary emigrants still have the greatest difficulty in finding sanctuary and new homes; in transferring their property from their countries of origin; and in obtaining permission to seek employment in countries of refuge.

At the same time, the onslaught of German National Socialism has struck a heavy blow at the doctrines of liberalism, rationalism and racial and religious tolerance in Central and Eastern Europe. New classes of refugees have been created as a result of the new totalitarian dogmas, which leave no room for political or social dissidents, or for those not included in the blood-brotherhood of the national community. In particular the modern German version of anti-Semitism has produced the outstanding refugee problem of the day. It is not, in any accepted American sense of the term, a Jewish problem: the number of Christian "non-Aryans" involved is believed to equal or surpass the total of actual or potential Jewish refugees.⁶ All are victims of Hitler's crusade against the Jews. Deeply rooted in German history, this has relatively little in common with the medieval persecution of the Israelites on religious grounds.⁷ It springs, rather, from the pseudo-scientific theories of Aryan racial supremacy propagated by the Comte de Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and other late nineteenth century writers, including a number of anti-Semitic Viennese and Sudeten Germans.⁸ In its current form, this doctrine represents the Jews as a people of homogeneous stock who incorporate within themselves every undesirable attribute, and seek to win mastery in the nations in which they live—particularly in "Aryan" Germany—by various means, including inter-marriage with the superior native element, whose blood is thus irreparably "debased."⁹ It follows that the racial unity, prosperity and glory of the German nation can only be assured if the Jews, stigmatized as international Communist conspirators, are eliminated from the national life of the country.

The Jews, largely concentrated in the cities as a result of their troubled past, provide a tangible

target because of the tenacity with which they have clung to their religious practices, and the successes scored by some of them in business and the urban professions. Scientists have pointed out that all Europeans, Jews and Germans included, are descended from a variety of mixed racial strains; that the term "Aryan" refers to a linguistic rather than a blood relationship; and that it is impossible as yet to postulate the innate general supremacy of one ethnic group over another.¹⁰ Such considerations, however, have not sufficed to save the Jewish community of Germany, with its great degree of cultural and physical assimilation, from disaster. Nor have they prevented the spread of this doctrine to other nations where the Jews constitute a more distinct element in the population.

GERMANY AND THE JEWS

Since 1933 the Jews of Germany have gradually been subjected to a process of social ostracism, political degradation and economic discrimination epitomized in the Nuremberg Racial Laws of September 1935,¹¹ as a consequence of which they have been forced out of virtually all branches of commerce, industry and professional life.¹² Nazi anti-Jewish activity has been particularly severe in Vienna, where an unprepared Jewish community of some 170,000 has been subjected to a brutal reign of terror and despoliation which is one of the dark chapters of the history of modern Europe.¹³ The result can only be forced emigration, or else absolute impoverishment and death, for "non-Aryan" Viennese—an elimination process whose completion by 1940 or 1942 has been publicly envisaged by Field Marshal Hermann Goering.¹⁴

While the Nazi authorities have on the one hand striven to force rapid emigration, they have also adopted measures making exodus in large numbers all but impossible. At one time, under the Nazi

10. Cf. Jacques Barzun, *Race: A Study in Modern Superstition* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1937).

11. For a statement of German anti-Jewish measures to the end of 1935, cf. *Letter of Resignation of James G. MacDonald, High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany, Addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations* (London, December 17, 1935), *Annex*, pp. 1-34.

12. Cf. Council for German Jewry and other Jewish Organizations, *Evian Conference Concerning Political Refugees; Memorandum of Certain Jewish Organizations Concerned with the Refugees from Germany and Austria* (London, 1938), pp. 3 ff.; Curt L. Heymann, "German Laws against the Jews," *Current History* (New York), March 1938, pp. 38-43.

13. Cf. Paris dispatch, *New York Times*, May 23, 1938.

14. In a speech of March 26, 1938 incorporating Austria within the scope of the German Four-Year Plan of 1936; text in *Völkischer Beobachter* (Berlin), March 28, 1938; cf. *New York Times*, March 27, 1938; Jewish Telegraphic Agency, *News* (New York), April 27, 1938.

5. Cf. "The Organisation of Migration for Settlement," *International Labour Review* (London), May 1938, pp. 561-83.

6. Cf. p. 194.

7. Cf. Hugo Valentin, *Anti-Semitism, Historically and Critically Examined* (London, Gollancz, 1936).

8. Cf. William L. Langer, "When German Dreams Come True," *Yale Review* (New Haven), Summer 1938, pp. 678-98.

9. M. S. Wertheimer, "Forces Underlying the Nazi Revolution," *Foreign Policy Reports*, July 19, 1933; "The Jews in the Third Reich," *ibid.*, October 11, 1933; Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (München, Zentralverlag der N.S.D.A.P., 1936), *passim*.

régime in Germany, Jewish emigrants with property exceeding 50,000 marks in value had been able to liquidate their affairs and transfer their funds on payment of an emigrants' flight tax of 25 per cent of the total value of their property. Recently, transfer of the remainder has been impossible except by use of a blocked account of *Sperrmarks*, which have been convertible into foreign exchange only at a rapidly diminishing fraction of their nominal value—now less than 10 per cent.¹⁵ It has consequently been estimated that, on leaving the country, Jews possessing property can realize only about 6 per cent of its value.¹⁶ Since June 4, 1938, moreover, emigrant Jews have been prohibited from taking any part of their property with them in foreign exchange.¹⁷ All Jews in Germany have also been required to make a declaration of their property and income to the government if these exceed 5,000 Reichsmarks. This move is regarded in some circles as the prelude to wholesale expropriation by legal means or administrative pressure.¹⁸

These acts, together with forcible physical expulsion by the *Gestapo* in some cases, have already produced a stream of destitute refugees in countries bordering on the Reich, who must somehow be received and supported by the outside world. Because of the time lag before permanent homes can be found for emigrants in such straitened circumstances, there has been an almost constant number of unsettled refugees, estimated at 30,000 to 35,000, in the countries adjacent to Germany during the last few years. As quickly as these are definitely placed new fugitives arrive.¹⁹

The number of Jews in Germany, classified by religion, was estimated at the beginning of 1933 to be almost 522,000; and according to the last official census of June 16, 1933, they numbered about 505,000.²⁰ By July 1938 the number who had left

Germany was set at 150,000.²¹ The excess of deaths over births since 1933 has surpassed 26,000,²² but the Austrian *Anschluss* has brought into the Reich an additional 191,000. Thus the total number of confessional Jews in Greater Germany today is between 515,000 and 520,000—a greater figure than that for 1933.²³ As a result of five years of terror and emigration, moreover, the age structure of the Jewish confessional community of Old Germany has been markedly altered, so that a rapid decrease in its size is indicated even if emigration should now cease. Desperate prospects for the future, and the flight of the young, have combined to produce the following status as of January 1, 1938:²⁴

Age Group	Percentage	Number
Up to 19 years	16	54,300
20 to 44 years	30	106,700
45 to 50 years	11	37,100
Above 50 years	43	151,900

Comparable conditions among the Austrian Jews may be expected to produce a similar age composition within a relatively brief period.

To this figure of 520,000 must be added a large number of Christian "non-Aryans"—a term defined by the Nazis as including all those with one or more Jewish grandparents. Because of the unscientific nature of the so-called racial distinction between "Aryans" and "non-Aryans," and the uncertainty regarding the degree of "non-Aryan" lineage subjected to the disabilities of the Nazi anti-Jewish legislation,²⁵ estimates of the number of "non-Aryans" in Germany who will be forced to emigrate vary widely.²⁶ In any event, the total is certainly several hundred thousand, while additional scores of thousands of Catholics, legitimists, and democratic and Left-wing leaders from the

15. *Evian Conference Concerning Political Refugees*, cited, p. 3.

16. League of Nations, *Refugees coming from Germany: Report submitted to the Nineteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations by Sir Neill Malcolm, High Commissioner, 1938* (Geneva, Document A.25.1938.XII.), pp. 5, 6.

17. They are also required to pay a 100 per cent tax on such articles as furniture, jewelry and furs taken abroad. For summary of these measures, cf. *Manchester Guardian*, August 10, 1938.

18. Cf. *Völkischer Beobachter*, April 28, 1938; *The Economist* (London), July 16, 1938, p. 115.

19. Cf. League of Nations, *Refugees coming from Germany: Report submitted to the Eighteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations by the High Commissioner, Sir Neill Malcolm, 1937* (Geneva, Document A.17.1937.XII.). If Austrian refugees succeed in evading frontier controls, this number will be markedly increased. Cf. also League of Nations, *Refugees coming from Germany: Report* (1938), cited.

20. Including Jews of the Saar on the same date. *La Reichtvertretung des Juifs en Allemagne, Pour la Conférence d'Evian* (1938), p. 1.

21. Statement of Sir Neill Malcolm, League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany, before the Evian Conference. Intergovernmental Committee, Evian, July 1938, *Verbatim Report of the Third Meeting*, July 9, 1938 (C.I.E./C.R.3). The proceedings of the conference, hereafter cited as *Verbatim Report*, have been mimeographed preparatory to publication, and are for the most part not successively paged.

22. *Pour la Conférence d'Evian*, cited, p. 1.

23. According to Jewish estimates, 30,000 Jews were living in the Sudeten German area prior to the Sudeten *Anschluss*; at least 20,000 were believed to have fled into what remains of Czechoslovakia, where their ultimate fate remains uncertain. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, *News*, October 6, 1938.

24. *Pour la Conférence d'Evian*, cited, pp. 2, 3.

25. Cf. Dorothy Thompson, *Refugees: Anarchy or Organization?* (New York, Random House, 1938), pp. 56-60; Georges Oudard, "Les Juifs de l'Europe Centrale," *Revue de Paris*, September 15, 1938, pp. 241-62.

26. The situation may be clarified as a result of a census scheduled to take place in May 1939. Cf. *Der Zeitspiegel* (Berlin), July 14, 1938, p. 331.

Sudeten territories as well as Austria have found it expedient to leave the country. It also appears likely that many Czechs inhabiting the areas ceded to the Reich and Poland—new Czech minorities of about one million—will be forced to seek sanctuary elsewhere.²⁷ Although the Munich Four-Power Accord of September 29, 1938 provided for a 6-months "right of option into and out of the transferred territories," no action has been taken to make this right effective. The Czech government—unable to provide for fleeing non-Nazi Sudeten and Austrian Germans, and unwilling to harbor another German minority within its borders—is already returning Germans to the Reich where, according to Konrad Henlein, opponents of the Nazis were to be imprisoned "until they turned black."²⁸ As semi-fascist elements gain the upper hand in Czechoslovakia, moreover, the situation of all minorities in that country becomes precarious.²⁹

POTENTIAL JEWISH REFUGEES

Should present trends continue, the German refugee problem may be dwarfed by the magnitude of those now appearing on the horizon. Foremost among these is the prospect of disaster confronting the 5,500,000 Jews dwelling in that portion of Europe bounded by the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, and the dictatorships of the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy. In this area the Jews constitute about 5 per cent of the total population, and are only one of a large number of minority groups which make up over 23 per cent of the total.³⁰ The lot of most of the non-Jewish minorities is eased by the existence of closely related national states which may intercede for them, or to which they may hope to migrate, or by the fact that they constitute a solid territorial or ethnic bloc. For the highly scattered Jewish communities, torn by factional strife and composed of individuals of highly diverse degrees of assimilation, these protective factors do not operate.³¹

Anti-Semitism has also made notable gains in

countries outside the Eastern European area. Notwithstanding *Il Duce's* numerous disclaimers of any intention to take steps against Italian Jews,³² the Italian government has now begun to discriminate against its small and ancient Jewish community of 57,425.³³ Following the publication on July 15, 1938 of a manifesto by a group of Fascist university professors announcing that the Italian race was of "Aryan" origin, the government opened a press campaign against Jews in Italy and outside; began to purge government, party and important business posts of Jews; and intimated that Jewish participation in certain branches of national life, such as teaching, retail trade and the professions, was either to be reduced to the Jewish *numerus proportionalis*—scarcely more than one in a thousand—or else curbed entirely.³⁴ Even in France, anti-Semitic propaganda has noticeably increased.³⁵ In all probability no nation on earth has been wholly immune from its effects. Thus the Jewish problem, and the problem of Jewish refugees, may soon become a dominant factor in the political situation in Europe.

THE LEAGUE AND THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

With the prospect of a greater rather than a smaller number of refugees in the immediate future, the question arises whether the international machinery already in existence to assist them is adequate. To deal with the immediate post-war wave of Russian and other refugees, the League of Nations enlisted the services of Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, whose organization—known after his death as the Nansen International Office for Refugees—has sought to protect the interests of numerous refugee groups which the League has entrusted to its care. In recent years this autonomous body, now headed by Judge Michael Hansson, has shared the

32. Claude Langlade, "Mussolini et la question juive," *L'Europe Nouvelle* (Paris), July 23, 1938, p. 791.

33. Official census of August 1938. *New York Times*, October 12, 1938.

34. For text of manifesto, cf. *Relazioni Internazionali* (Milan), July 23, 1938, p. 536. For other measures, cf. *ibid.*, July 30, 1938, pp. 546, 549; *Informazione Diplomatica* (Rome), August 5, 1938. In a decree of September 7, 1938 the government announced that all Jews who had arrived in Italy or had been naturalized after January 1, 1919 would be denationalized and forced to leave the country within six months. For text of decrees, cf. *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), September 13, 14, 1938. Marriages between Italians and "non-Aryans" were forbidden on October 7, 1938. *New York Times*, October 7, 1938.

35. Cf. for example, *Le Cri du Jour* (Paris), April 30, 1938; *Je Suis Partout* (Paris; Numéro spécial), April 15, 1938. Such propaganda has been most virulent in Alsace-Lorraine, where its political implications may become ominous. *Le Populaire* (Paris), October 8, 1938. The French government, however, has definitely refused to adopt a racist policy. Cf. speech of M. Campinchi, Minister of Marine, *Le Temps*, June 20, 1938.

27. Czech sources assert that there are 850,000 Czechs in Sudetenland and 120,000 in the territory occupied by Poland.

28. *New York Times*, September 30, October 11-14, 1938.

29. The Jewish population of Czechoslovakia in 1930 was 356,830, of whom 76,031 lived in Bohemia; 41,250 in Moravia and Silesia; 136,737 in Slovakia; and 102,542 in Ruthenia. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Statistical Tables on the Distribution, Migration and Natural Increase of the Jews in the World* (submitted to the Evian Conference, July 1938).

30. Compiled from census reports by Oscar I. Janowsky, *People at Bay: The Jewish Problem in East-Central Europe* (New York, Oxford, 1938), pp. 13, 39, 40.

31. The problems confronting these Jews may be considered in a forthcoming issue of *Foreign Policy Reports*.

work with a distinct entity established to aid German refugees—the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany, under Sir Neill Malcolm.³⁶⁻³⁷ Since the League has always regarded each refugee problem, taken separately, as a temporary one, both bodies had been scheduled to end their labors on December 31, 1938.

Both these organizations have been useful within their sphere of activity, but this has in the main been limited to responsibility for the political and legal protection of refugees.³⁸ This is an important undertaking, for stateless refugees are often subject to forcible expulsion from their country of refuge, or deprived of the power to secure employment there. Under League auspices international instruments have been concluded to furnish such stateless persons with certificates of identity, facilities for international travel, some protection against expulsion, a better defined legal status, and certain privileges regarding employment and social welfare benefits.³⁹ For German refugees, a Provisional Arrangement of July 4, 1936 (signed by eight states and applied in practice by several others) has been recast in a more definitive form in a convention signed on February 10, 1938. This convention confers on the refugees certain privileges of sojourn and residence in the signatory countries; provides for the issuance of a travel and identity document in a specified form; grants a certain degree of protection against forcible return to Germany; and substantially repeats the provisions of the 1933 convention with respect to legal status, labor conditions and social welfare.⁴⁰

Even if these carefully restricted provisions, which do not protect all refugees, were fully applied by all countries of refuge, they would offer only a precarious measure of security to those concerned. In fact, however, some governments have hedged their approval about with devitalizing reservations, and in many cases—particularly in the matter of expulsion—enforcement of the provi-

sions leaves something to be desired. The League, moreover, is not in general concerned with financing and directing the relief, occupational retraining or final settlement of refugees, which is left to private organizations. It takes no steps to care for persecuted minority groups until these have been forced to leave their countries of origin. It cannot negotiate, even through its nominally autonomous organizations, with Germany or other countries to which the very name of Geneva is anathema. It lacks the vital cooperation of the United States and several South American nations. Nor has it been able to divorce general political considerations from its work: the Soviet Union, for example, has opposed prolongation of the life of the Nansen Office because its personnel included Russian refugees suspected of anti-Soviet activities. The presence of actual or potential refugee-producing countries in the League, where unanimity is necessary for substantive action, constitutes a major obstacle to comprehensive steps in aid of involuntary emigrants: this factor explains in part the League's failure to assist such refugees as the Italian anti-Fascists and the Portuguese.

These considerations should not detract from the value of the work of the League and its affiliated organizations—negatively, in forestalling the creation of new political emigrants by countries sensitive to the public criticism which would follow; and positively, by symbolizing the humanitarian obligation of organized international assistance, by striving to coordinate the efforts of private organizations, and by intervening between the refugees and utter despair.⁴¹ After overcoming long and stubborn opposition by the Soviet government, the League Council in May 1938 finally approved a draft plan for continuation of this work, by amalgamation of the two League refugee organizations under a single High Commissioner. The new office is charged with supervision of the 600,000 unabsorbed refugees still recognized as such by the League.⁴² On September 30, 1938 the Assembly appointed Sir Herbert Emerson High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees for a five-year term beginning January 1, 1939.^{42a}

36-37. For a report on League refugee activities, cf. Norman Bentwich, "The International Problem of Refugees," *Foreign Policy Reports*, February 12, 1936.

38. Cf. Sir John Hope Simpson, *Refugees: Preliminary Report of a Survey* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1938), pp. 74 ff.

39. The basic instrument for protection of the "Nansen refugees" (Russian, Armenian, Assyrian, Turkish and assimilated, and Saar refugees) is the convention of October 28, 1933, ratified by eight European nations. For text, cf. League of Nations, Document C.650.M.311.1933.

40. For text, cf. League of Nations, Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany (Geneva, February 10, 1938), Document C.75.M.30.1938.XII. Seven countries have signed the convention, and Britain and Belgium have already ratified it. It entered into force on October 27, 1938. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, *News*, October 6, 1938; *The Times*, October 6, 1938.

41. Cf. Simpson, *Refugees*, cited, pp. 95-98.

42. League of Nations, Minutes of the Hundred-and-First Session of the Council, *Official Journal*, May-June 1938, pp. 365-68. At the same time, the work of the High Commissioner for German refugees was provisionally extended to include refugees from Austria, subject to final decision by the Assembly.

42a. The headquarters of the new organization are to be established at London, and no refugees or former refugees may be employed on its staff. League of Nations, *International Assistance to Refugees: Report of the Sixth Committee to the Assembly* (Geneva, September 28, 1938; Document A.54.1938.-XII.); *Journal of the Nineteenth Session of the Assembly*, October 1, 1938, p. 279.

THE EVIAN "CONFERENCE"⁴³

The sudden brutalities to which both Austrian and German Jews were subjected after *Anschluss* made it obvious that a problem of new magnitude, which would overtax the facilities of private organizations, had been created. Particularly in the United States, many humanitarians felt that a new international body, free from the limitations of the existing League offices as described above, was necessary to cope with the situation.⁴⁴ Liberals declared that, if democracies based on a tradition of tolerance and fairness were to survive, they should make a contribution toward the salvation of unfortunates persecuted because of their race or their political beliefs.⁴⁵

Acting in this spirit, the United States government, on March 24, 1938, dispatched communications to twenty American republics and nine European countries inquiring whether they would "be willing to cooperate in setting up a special committee for the purpose of facilitating the emigration from Austria and presumably from Germany of political refugees." The financing of such emigration, it was stated, would probably be undertaken by private organizations; "no country would be expected or asked to receive a greater number of immigrants than is permitted by its existing legislation"; and there would be no interference with such work as is already being done by any existing international agency.⁴⁶ Italy alone rejected the invitation; and the addition of three British Dominions to the list of nations attending brought the total to thirty-two.⁴⁷ Apparently fearing that it would incur the wrath of its Nazi neighbor, the Swiss government rejected the American sugges-

tion that the meeting be held on its territory, but the French permitted it to be convened at Evian.

When the conference opened on July 6, Myron C. Taylor, chairman of the United States delegation and of the session as a whole, set the stage for its deliberations with a review of the problem which, he stated, demanded action "promptly and effectively in a long-range program of comprehensive scale." Admitting that all that could be done at Evian was to establish machinery to deal with the problem of German and Austrian refugees and correlate it with existing bodies, he remarked that the "ultimate objective should be to establish an organization which would concern itself with all refugees, wherever governmental intolerance shall have created a refugee problem." The new organization was to complement existing League machinery. Delegates were to exchange in confidence details regarding the number and type of immigrants whom each government was prepared to receive under its existing laws and practices, and to consider the problem of documenting refugees unable to obtain passports. As its contribution, the United States government would admit the full total of 27,370 immigrants, whose entry was permitted under the combined German and Austrian immigration quotas each year. The United States government hoped that permanent collaboration of the participating governments might be effected by regular meeting of their diplomatic representatives, perhaps at Paris, with a secretariat in charge of administrative details. In conclusion, Mr. Taylor strongly condemned "the forced and chaotic dumping of unfortunate peoples in large numbers," which heightened racial and religious problems and engendered economic retaliation, suspicion, fear and "catastrophic human suffering" all over the world.⁴⁸ Lord Winterton, chief of the British delegation, expressed his general agreement with Mr. Taylor's position and stressed the fact that the task of the meeting would be "immeasurably complicated" if Germany did not make its contribution by giving the emigrants some means of self-support. Penniless emigrants, he stated, would not be admitted to countries of settlement, and private societies could not undertake the necessary efforts to assist them on an adequate scale.⁴⁹

These humanitarian sentiments, which were echoed in the speeches of all the delegates, immediately gave way, however, to the diplomatic caution natural in an assemblage where all admitted that

43. While the term "conference" is not an exact description of the intergovernmental meeting held at Evian, it has been so widely used, even by the delegates, that the word is employed in this report.

44. Dorothy Thompson, "Refugees: A World Problem," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), April 1938, pp. 375-87.

45. Anne O'Hare McCormick, *New York Times*, August 22, 1938.

46. For summary of the notes, cf. State Department, *Press Releases*, March 26, 1938, p. 411. The appeal is understood to have originated with President Roosevelt personally. *New York Times*, March 25, 1938.

47. The following countries were officially represented: Australia, the Argentine Republic, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, United Kingdom, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. The Union of South Africa sent an observer; and representatives of the Polish and Rumanian governments, which are eager to provide an outlet for Jewish emigration from their countries, were also present at Evian in an unofficial capacity. Even the German government sent Jewish representatives from Berlin and Vienna, whose private appeals to the delegates made a deep impression.

48. For text of speech, cf. State Department, *Press Releases*, July 6, 1938, pp. 19 ff.

49. Intergovernmental Committee, Evian, July 1938, *Verbatim Report of the First Meeting*, July 6, 1938, C.I./E.C.R.1.

something should be done, but each desired the other to do it. The British, whose position was apparently endorsed by the French throughout, at first insisted that the Evian meeting should merely set up an advisory committee attached to the League refugee organization to be created in September 1938 at Geneva. Such action would obviously have permitted Britain to exercise a considerable degree of control over refugee work and might have prevented any radical moves—either of opposition to the dictatorships creating refugees or of utilization of undeveloped territories—which would prove embarrassing to Britain, the largest colonial power and the leader in attempts to reach agreement with the fascist dictators. This may in part explain why Lord Winterton, who was supported by the Norwegians, with their large share in refugee work, and the French, warned against duplication of League activities.⁵⁰ Yet all parties admitted the advantages of an organization which would include the United States and could negotiate with Germany without being hampered by the activities of other potential refugee-producing countries.

Despite the desire of the American delegation to set up a body dealing with all refugees, it was soon agreed that such an organization would be confronted with an impossibly heavy burden. The fear was also expressed that the existence of machinery theoretically set up to assist all involuntary emigrants would encourage such countries as Poland, Rumania and Spain to follow the German example and intensify persecution of racial, religious and political minorities in order to force them on an inhospitable world.⁵¹

NO DEFINITE COMMITMENTS

Specific contributions for the benefit of refugees were noticeably absent from the speeches of the delegates. Many were unfamiliar with the problem and feared an adverse political response, in their respective states, to any offer involving an increased influx of foreigners during a period of economic stress. In general, the countries represented at the conference—all actual or potential havens for refugees—fall into two groups. The first is composed of “countries of refuge”—the thickly populated European states situated close to Germany, which offer for the most part only temporary shelter for fugitives, many of whom eventually make their way to countries of permanent settlement. While

professing the best of intentions toward refugees, these limitrophe countries are estopped by two factors from liberalizing their attitude. First, since most of them already harbor an unduly large number of refugees, they must face powerful demands from labor and professional bodies for the protection of the national labor market with its existing unemployed.⁵² Second, any intimation that refugees will be welcomed or frontier control relaxed constitutes a signal for the German *Gestapo* to dump destitute victims across the border involved.

Stressing these considerations, individual countries of refuge did not conceal their unwillingness to absorb new refugees. The British recalled that they had admitted young workers to serve apprenticeships in industry prior to subsequent re-emigration, and had allowed many refugees to remain permanently, but insisted that theirs was not an immigration country.⁵³ The French, with a record of unparalleled liberalism in the treatment of their 200,000 refugees (of Spanish, Italian and other nationality, as well as German), stated that their nation had “reached, if not already passed, the extreme point of saturation.”⁵⁴ Belgium, with about 15,000 German and other refugees, refused to assume fresh international obligations except in proportion to those which the other nations present agreed to adopt.⁵⁵ While the Netherlands could not absorb the 25,000 refugees still on its territory, it was ready to assist agricultural and industrial training schemes preparatory to final settlement elsewhere, and to admit new refugees for this purpose as their predecessors depart.⁵⁶ The delegates of Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland adopted a similar position.

While most of the second group—overseas countries suited for permanent settlement—admittedly stand to gain by an increased population to exploit their undeveloped resources, they too were unanimous in rejecting any suggestion of large-scale settlement on their territories. The Latin American

52. Thus, in Britain, which with its estimated 15,000 refugees has not received a disproportionate share, the British Medical Association has apparently succeeded in limiting the number of Austrian doctors to be admitted to not many more than 50. *The Times*, July 16, 1938.

53. Speech of Lord Winterton, *Verbatim Report, First Meeting*.

54. Speech of M. Béranger, *ibid.* By a decree law of May 2, 1938 and a circular of the Ministry of Interior of May 28, 1938 France has further improved the condition of the refugees already on its soil, particularly with respect to security against arbitrary expulsion. Cf. *Industrial and Labour Information* (Geneva), May 23, 1938, pp. 221-22; June 6, 1938, pp. 282-83; League of Nations, *Nansen International Office for Refugees: Report of the Governing Body for the Year ending June 30, 1938* (Document A. 21.1938.XII., Geneva, 1938), p. 5.

55. Speech of M. de Foy, *Verbatim Report, Second Meeting*, July 7, 1938.

56. Speech of M. Beucker-Andrae, *ibid.*, pp. 18 ff.

50. *Ibid.*, speeches of Lord Winterton, M. Béranger, and M. Hansson (Norway).

51. Cf. speech of Lord Winterton, *ibid.* It is largely for this reason that all existing refugee organizations have been formed after the event and for the purpose of aiding a definite group of victims.

countries, some of which are contending with low wages and unemployment in their urban centers, wish to restrict immigration to trained agriculturalists and workers with specialized technical skills. These countries, moreover, are determined to admit immigrants only in groups small enough to be rapidly assimilated.⁵⁷ Thus, Brazilian law demands that 80 per cent of each country's immigration quota must be allotted to agricultural immigrants who cannot change their occupation for four years after arrival.⁵⁸ Argentina refused to restrict the discretion of its immigration authorities.⁵⁹ Seconding this position, the Chilean representative stressed the necessity for an expansion of foreign markets before masses of workers who will increase the national production are admitted.⁶⁰ It also appears that in some Latin American states where large German populations exist or German trade arrangements are used by the Reich as a lever for political influence, administrative action on immigration might be colored by anti-Semitism.⁶¹

The British government, moreover, refused to open British colonial territories for general settlement, because of conditions of climate, race, and political development—a stand supported by the Dutch delegate.⁶² Lord Winterton emphatically declared that, because of the special circumstances now existing in Palestine, revival of large-scale Jewish immigration to that territory was impossible until a decision was made on the issue of partition of the country.⁶³ Britain was, however, investigating the prospects for small-scale settlement of Jewish refugees in Kenya.⁶⁴

The attitude of Australia—where six million white inhabitants dwell on a continent threatened with an influx of Asiatic peoples—is particularly illuminating. Refusing to contemplate any increase in non-British immigration, Lieutenant-Colonel T.

W. White, the Australian spokesman, declared that "as we have no real racial problem we are not desirous of importing one by encouraging any scheme of large-scale foreign migration."⁶⁵ For Canada, Mr. Hume Wrong defended the general prohibition of entry which has been in effect since 1930 by reference to the unemployment and economic stress existing in the Dominion.⁶⁶ The delegate from New Zealand also warned against false hopes that his country could accept any large number of refugees.⁶⁷

Despite this discouraging outlook, Mr. Taylor, in his speech at the closing meeting on July 15, hailed the establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee as a real achievement and declared that the statements made in confidence by the governments held out prospects for increased reception of refugees within the framework of existing immigration laws and practices. He emphasized once more the necessity of replacing disorderly exodus by orderly emigration of individuals taking their property and possessions with them—a condition demanding the collaboration of the country of origin.⁶⁸

While hopes for immediate large-scale aid for German refugees were thus vanishing, conversations had been proceeding between American, British and French delegates to reconcile divergences of view on the scope and function of the new body. Possibly to secure the fullest British participation, its seat was established at London, and Lord Winterton was named permanent chairman. The Americans, however, received the post of director of the committee—which has been filled by George Rublee—and are therefore in charge of the actual executive machinery of the Intergovernmental Committee. The refugees to be assisted were defined as "persons who have not already left their country of origin (Germany including Austria), but who must emigrate on account of their political opinions, religious beliefs, or racial origin, and (2) persons as defined in (1) who have already left their country of origin and who have not yet established themselves permanently elsewhere."⁶⁹ As "director of authority" Mr. Rublee has been authorized to "undertake negotiations to improve the present conditions of exodus and to replace them with conditions of orderly emi-

65. *Ibid.*

66. A small number of immigrants has, however, been admitted by special administrative order in individual cases, and a "sympathetic application" of the regulations was promised. Speech of Mr. Hume Wrong, *ibid.*

67. Speech of Mr. W. B. Burckedin, *Verbatim Report, Third Meeting*, pp. 2, 3.

68. State Department, *Press Releases*, July 16, 1938, p. 34.

69. For text of resolution adopted July 14, 1938, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

57. *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), July 8, 9, 1938; *La Opinión* (Ciudad Trujillo), July 26, 1938; *Verbatim Report, passim*.

58. Speech of M. Helio Lobo, *Verbatim Report, Second Meeting*, p. 4; *Industrial and Labour Information*, June 13, 1938, p. 322.

59. Speech of M. le Breton, *Verbatim Report, Second Meeting*. In July and August 1938 Argentina temporarily suspended all immigration, and announced that new and more stringent regulations would go into effect on October 1. The purpose of this action was stated to be the control and selection of immigrants, with preference for those with the greatest aptitude for assimilation, and careful regulation to prevent low-wage employment and unemployment. *The Times* (London), August 5, 27, 1938.

60. Speech of M. García Oldini, *ibid.*

61. Cf., in the case of Chile, *New York Times*, August 6, 1938.

62. Speech of Lord Winterton, *Verbatim Report, First Meeting*; speech of M. Beucker-Andrae, *Verbatim Report, Second Meeting*, p. 20.

63. Cf. D. H. Popper, "Liquidating the Palestine Mandate," *Foreign Policy Reports*, November 15, 1937.

64. *Verbatim Report, Sixth Meeting*.

gration," and to "approach the governments of refuge with a view to developing opportunities for permanent settlement."⁷⁰ The delicate task of negotiating with Germany to secure an arrangement whereby refugees may transfer some of their assets abroad has been delayed by the Sudeten crisis.

Thus the Evian meeting can be termed successful only in the sense that it succeeded in clarifying the existing situation, setting up permanent machinery to attempt to deal with the problem, and—possibly—leading some countries to adopt a somewhat more sympathetic interpretation of existing administrative regulations blocking immigration.⁷¹ The only concrete contribution has been the undertaking by the United States to admit 27,370 Germans annually—a considerable increase over the figure for the past few years.⁷² Those who expected any substantive steps in aid of refugees at Evian have therefore been harsh in their criticism of the meeting. Others, more aware of the difficulties created by existing political and economic conditions, do not minimize the promise held out by the beginning which has been made. Unencumbered by the inevitable restrictions of League of Nations political procedure and organizational inertia, the new committee may develop the driving energy and the broad power of negotiation necessary for concrete achievement.⁷³

PROSPECTS FOR RESETTLEMENT

The magnitude of the task undertaken by the committee has been carefully surveyed by experts. Assuming that the older generation is not suited for emigration, they have calculated that the total number to be resettled is about 660,900, including 198,000 Jews in Old Germany, 102,300 in former Austria, approximately 285,516 "non-Aryans" and 75,000 Roman Catholics. Recent surveys of Jewish emigrants indicate that about 29 per cent have been business men and office employees; 19 per cent,

craftsmen; 6 per cent, members of the liberal professions; 4 per cent, laborers; and 4 per cent, domestic workers; but the current intensification of agricultural training for the young in Germany suggests that the proportion of agricultural workers may in future be materially increased. Of the non-Jews (including "non-Aryans") emigrating from Austria, 32 per cent have been engaged in agriculture. At the current rate of refugee emigration from Germany—about 40,000 a year since the *Anschluss*—the task of resettlement would require about 16 years. In view of the plight of those forced to emigrate, however, it is desirable to complete resettlement within the next five years.⁷⁴

From the point of view of public authorities, it is apparent that the humanitarian aspects of this problem are overshadowed by its political, social and economic implications. In a fiercely nationalistic world no nation can be expected willingly to assume a burden thrust upon it by ruthless persecution elsewhere. This point is entirely disregarded by the German press, which accuses the democratic nations of hypocrisy because they profess sympathy for the refugees but do not open their doors to them.⁷⁵ By sharply increasing the intensity of its anti-Semitic campaign at the moment when these nations are preparing a measure of alleviation for the sufferers, the German government has not only exasperated officials in the refugee-receiving countries, but has decreased their willingness to take any measures which Germany might utilize to "dump" still more refugees outside its borders. The Reich has thus helped to hinder the very emigration it professes to desire.

A less brutal policy on the part of the Nazis would, indeed, contribute to the restoration of a more balanced conception of the economic aspects of emigration. A chaotic flight of penniless individuals is an unmitigated burden, creating political resentment, grave social problems, and economic difficulties in the countries of refuge. On the other hand, an ordered migration, particularly if the migrants command certain capital resources, may prove an economic boon to the country of settlement. As the great pre-war migrations and the more recent case of Palestine demonstrate, the economic position of relatively undeveloped territories is in the long run benefited by an increase in population, production and consumption. Even for thickly settled countries, a regulated immigration may prove beneficial, despite the existence of un-

70. *Ibid.*

71. There is some indication that this has already been the case in the United Kingdom. Such developments, however beneficial, are infinitesimal when compared with the size of the need.

72. In the fiscal year ended June 30, 1938 the United States admitted 11,917 refugees from Germany, Jewish and non-Jewish; in the preceding year, 10,895; in the fiscal year 1936, 6,346; in 1935, 5,210; and in 1934, 4,392. Statistics of the National Coordinating Committee for aid to refugees and emigrants coming from Germany, Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain, chairman. *New York Times*, September 13, 1938. No decision has yet been taken on the question whether Sudeten German refugees are to be assisted by the Intergovernmental Committee, nor has the Department of State yet announced any change in immigration quotas to bring them into alignment with the new German frontiers.

73. For contrasting views, cf. *The Times*, July 16, 1938; *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 15, 22, 1938.

74. Data from official sources. Cf. *New York Times*, *New York Herald Tribune*, August 5, 1938. These estimates, considered extremely conservative, do not include Sudetenland.

75. Cf. Arthur Rosenberg, *Völkischer Beobachter*, July 8, 1938; *Der Angriff* (Berlin), July 14, 1938.

employment. Where immigrants invest capital in productive enterprise, contribute new technical skills and establish new industries, the effect is clearly apparent. In England, for example, it is estimated that refugees have established enterprises employing a number of workmen greater than the total number of refugees who have arrived.⁷⁶⁻⁷⁷ In Holland, new garment industries have been set up, increasing employment and cutting imports.⁷⁸

Such benefits presuppose, to some extent, a selective process of immigration which might do little for the less talented or less well trained masses. Confronted with the problem of providing for such individuals, a subcommittee of the Intergovernmental Committee, set up to receive information from nearly forty private organizations with representatives at Evian, noted four principal suggestions for dealing with the situation: increased immigration to Palestine; measures of assistance to secure quick assimilation in the new national environment of refugees; mass settlement in uninhabited areas; and full protection of minority rights in the countries where Jews are now settled.⁷⁹

The last of these is doubtless a basic prerequisite for permanent solution of the refugee problem, but there seems to be little prospect that it can in fact be achieved. It would involve resumption of migration to alleviate the general population problem of Eastern Europe, together with large expenditures for industrialization and agrarian reform to increase the productive capacity and raise the standard of life of the potential refugee-producing countries. Grandiose schemes of this type, however, have a distinctly Utopian flavor.

Prior to 1936 it appeared that acceleration of immigration to Palestine might afford a partial solution of the Jewish problem. In the four years 1933-1936 an average of 40,000 Jews from all countries entered the Holy Land annually, and this figure would certainly have been far surpassed if it had not been for the restraint enforced by the mandatory government.⁸⁰ Zionist organizations estimate the absorptive capacity of Palestine as a whole at 60,000 to 100,000 Jews a year.⁸¹ Such prognostications, however, customarily ignore the poverty of

land and resources in Palestine and its ultimate effect upon absorptive capacity, as well as the fact that the tenacious resistance of a part of the Arab population would probably be strengthened by a new wave of immigration. As long as civil strife rages in Palestine, it is obvious that Britain will not be inclined to open it to large-scale Jewish settlement. Partition of the territory along the lines recommended by the Peel Commission in 1937, moreover, would drastically restrict immigration possibilities.⁸²

Jewish groups not exclusively interested in Palestine have formulated innumerable projects for mass settlement or agricultural colonization by Jews in virtually every potential migration territory. They are motivated by the view that if a sizeable proportion of the world's 16,000,000 Jews could be compactly settled in a region sufficiently large for some degree of autonomous life, the millennial problem of the Jew might cease to exist in its present form. Merely to state the proposition, however, is to reveal the extreme improbability of its consummation. Contrary to general assumption, most of the pioneer lands remaining for settlement are marginal (in the economic sense) in climate, fertility and transport facilities, so that for the most part colonization on a productive basis has become a difficult operation requiring some form of outside assistance and involving a considerable reduction in the pioneer's standard of living.⁸³ The cost of this type of settlement—generally calculated at \$2,500 to \$5,000 a family—precludes its adoption on a large scale. Assuming an average figure of \$3,500, it is apparent that the cost of settling 1,000 families would be \$3,500,000; and of settling 100,000 families, \$350,000,000. These totals are far beyond the resources of private refugee organizations. A long and difficult period of training, moreover, would be necessary to adapt urban refugees to the conditions of rural existence in unfamiliar lands. And no nation today seems willing to admit to its territory masses of settlers large enough to resist political absorption, or to alienate any part of its domain. The reception of even small immigrant groups may possibly engender an anti-foreign reaction where none existed before. Clearly, group settlement on the land in appreciable numbers is a matter of generations; and the idea is pertinent to-

76-77. For an interesting debate on this point, cf. letters of R. F. Harrod and J. A. Hobson, *Manchester Guardian*, July 25, 1938; *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 15, 1938, p. 52.

78. Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in the Netherlands*, by R. V. Laming (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, March 1938), p. 54.

79. Intergovernmental Committee, *Report of the Sub-Committee for the Reception of Organisations Concerned with the Relief of Political Refugees Coming from Germany Including Austria*, Evian, July 9, 1938, C.I.E./5.

80. Cf. *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937), Cmd. 5479, p. 279.

81. *Memorandum of the World Jewish Congress Submitted to Delegates to the Evian Conference* (Geneva, 1938), p. 6; S. Klinger, *The Ten Year Plan for Palestine* (London, New Zionist Press, 1938), *passim*. This calculation does not include Transjordan.

82. Between 1932 and 1935 over 60 per cent of all Jewish emigrants went to Palestine. Cf. Jewish Agency, *Statistical Tables on the Distribution, Migration and Natural Increase of the Jews in the World*, cited, p. 5. Almost 40,000 German Jews have settled there since 1933.

day only because relatively small-scale colonization now may provide nuclei for future immigration.⁸⁴⁻⁸⁵

The alternative to colonization is gradual infiltration, on an individual basis, into countries of settlement. This method of emigration is economical—particularly where immigrants remain in cities, where their technical or professional skill can easily command an income; it leads to rapid absorption; and it minimizes the prospects for bad feeling in the country of settlement.⁸⁶ It remains to be seen, however, whether the nations represented at Evian will agree to absorb refugees on anything like the scale required.⁸⁷ At the moment it is difficult to envisage the migration of more than 40,000 to 50,000 a year by this method, assuming that the United States continues its present policy. To prepare and finance the emigration of even such a number is a considerable undertaking.

Under these circumstances, the Intergovernmental Committee is forced to canvass every opportunity for ameliorating the lot of the refugees. Only a combination of infiltration and settlement can possibly hold out the hope of even a barely adequate solution—always provided that no new refugee groups of great size are created. The crux of the committee's task lies in the financial problem. It is believed that, if this can be solved, the political obstacles to immigration will not prove insuperable. Suggestions have been made for the institution of a scheme whereby refugees might transfer a share of their assets abroad in the form of goods purchased in Germany for settlement purposes or general sale in foreign lands.⁸⁸ A plan of this type would, to be sure, increase German exports and might therefore be palatable to the Reich; but it would not necessarily increase Germany's supply of foreign exchange, for the sake of which its external trade is now conducted. Nor would many foreign countries be willing to open their doors to additional German products for the benefit of the refugees alone. Just what *quid pro quo* may be offered to Germany, therefore, remains un-

clear unless it be merely an agreement to shelter those whom the Reich wishes to deport; and, meanwhile, the resources of refugees which might be mobilized for emigration purposes are being exhausted for the necessities of existence or confiscated by the government.⁸⁹

Another proposal calls for an international loan to finance emigration, perhaps secured on the property of the German refugees in the Reich and their assets in the countries of settlement. Previous experience with this type of venture has not been unsatisfactory. Such a loan would doubtless require governmental cooperation and guarantees, as well as supervision by the Intergovernmental Committee or a similar public international agency. It might also be supplemented by philanthropic effort on the scale of the Hoover relief work at the close of the World War.

It is apparent that the technical obstacles to emigration, great as they are, are not the principal factor preventing adequate treatment of the refugee problem. Given a real determination to assist the refugees, these obstacles could be quickly overcome. But as long as the problem is considered one of secondary importance by the countries of potential settlement, warranting no extraordinary efforts and no sacrifices, hopes for an integral solution must remain dim. Fugitives must continue to be trapped in Central and Eastern Europe because of the political and financial difficulties of emigration—unless they are goaded to mass suicide, or unless the outbreak of a general war still further aggravates their condition. Yet simple humanitarian considerations, which are an essential component of the liberal democratic ideology, make inertia impossible. In this sense, every additional refugee successfully rescued from sub-human conditions vindicates belief in active democracy and religious ethics. The odds against which the Intergovernmental Committee must contend are admittedly enormous; at best it can probably hope for only partial success. More than this is not to be expected until national barriers to trade and migration are sufficiently relaxed to ease the tensions which are the source of totalitarianism.

83. Cf. Isaiah Bowman and others, *Limits of Land Settlement: A Report on Present-day Possibilities* (New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1937), *passim*.

84-85. For a more extended discussion, cf. Simpson, *Refugees*, cited, pp. 184-87.

86. Cf. speech of Sir Neill Malcolm, *Verbatim Report, Third Meeting*.

87. Despite the urgent need of several of the British Dominions for a large population on both economic and strategic grounds, and despite the inability of the United Kingdom to furnish the immigrants required, British authorities are extremely hesitant in recommending the admission of any but Northern European stock to the Empire. Great Britain, Dominions Office, *Report of the Overseas Settlement Board* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938), May 1938, Cmd. 5766, pp. 16, 34 ff. Cf. Norman Bentwich, "The Evian Conference and After," *Fortnightly* (London), September 1938, pp. 287-95.

88. Cf. Thompson, *Refugees*, cited, pp. 101-18. Such plans are patterned upon the *Haavara* mark system, under which German Jews emigrating to Palestine have transferred the equivalent of almost \$22,500,000 to the Holy Land. Jewish Agency for Palestine, *The Establishment in Palestine of the Jewish National Home: Memorandum on the Development of the Jewish National Home, 1937, submitted to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for the Information of the Permanent Mandates Commission, June 1938* (London, 1938), p. 7.

89. Mr. Myron C. Taylor has estimated the wealth of Germany's potential refugees at two to six billion dollars. If it could be used, even the lower figure would be more than sufficient to re-establish 500,000 people elsewhere. *New York Times*, October 4, 1938.